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Executive Summary
This study was contracted by Sida and NORAD for the purpose of
summarising experiences in capacity building for Public Finance Management
(PFM) in Africa. In particular, the two organisations’ attempts to take a more
comprehensive approach to PFM were to be highlighted. It is hoped that the
study will be useful for other donors as they increase their support to capacity
building within PFM.
The study is a desk study, based on a review of policy documents, reports and
project documentation of cases selected for study. The material does not
provide a basis for drawing firm conclusions as to what are “best practices” in
the field. The term “best practices“ itself is unclear and depends much on the
environment within which PFM projects and programmes work. The first half
of the report summarises experience whereas the second half, in two country
annexes, analyses selected case projects and programmes.
Along with Brobäck and Sjölander (2001)1, we include the following
components in the concept of PFM: planning and budgeting, accounting,
payments, audit and revenues. For the purpose of this study, governance, i.e.
parliamentary and cabinet roles in relation to the other components, was
included as an additional component. Capacity building includes the
education and training of individuals as well as organisational development.
Also, capacity building will include the “rules” aspect – formal laws and
policies as well as other informal norms that stipulate limits for individuals
and organisations.
An overview of the Swedish and Norwegian approach for support to PFM
reveals a number of similarities between the two donors. In particular, since
the seventies and eighties, their approach has moved away from the concept of
“filling holes” based on stand-alone technical assistance to PFM institutions.
Presently, the donor agencies, at least in theory, approach PFM as a system,
comprising the above-mentioned components. In the diagnostic phase they
attempt to take a systemic view, although most interventions focus
components or sub-components.
Institutional co-operation and twinning have replaced the earlier use of
individual experts working as TA personnel in the recipient organisation. Both
countries have to an increasing extent seen the importance of long-term
relationships between individuals and institutions as necessary in PFM
intervention. A participatory approach is emphasised and the use of proper
analysis of institutional development built on LFA-type methods is considered
important.
                                           
1 Brobäck, U. and Sjölander, S., ‘Programme Support and Public Finance Management, A
New Role for Bilateral Donors in Poverty Strategy Work’, Sida studies no.6, 2001
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In general, Sida has been in the lead in this development. Policy studies were
undertaken in the early nineties leading to the definition of PFM as a distinct
sector with comprehensive guidelines. NORAD has largely seen PFM as a sub-
component of institutional development. In the eighties, Swedish national
PFM institutions developed international divisions, which undertook
consultancies and twinning operations. A recent development in Norwegian
assistance has been the emphasis on governance issues and a focus on local
government as well as corruption. For both the countries the trends of basket
support such as sectoral programmes and budget/macro support have brought
PFM issues to the fore.
The report’s section on experiences and lessons learned is organised along the
lines of the phases of a project cycle, starting with the diagnostic phase,
continuing with design and formulation and ending with implementation.
Importantly, the study also considers the wider environment in which PFM
projects are implemented.
Diagnostic Phase
The study stresses the importance of analysis of the system, focusing the
targeted component but also including other components (a systemic view).
The trade-off between continued analysis and start of implementation is
stressed.
Preparatory analysis can contribute significantly to awareness raising. Needs
awareness must be raised on both sides, but is often considered to be relevant
only on the recipient side. It is often assumed that the donor is equipped with
all the experienced and skilled personnel needed for a project. Needs analyses
often focus technical issues whereas managerial training and development are
given less priority. Also the “soft” side of organisational development is
considered sensitive, threatening and difficult and therefore often avoided.
Twinning, supposed to include all relevant aspects of organisational
development, should in theory alleviate problems but in practice does not
always do so.
Local consultants and others who have worked “inside” or studied PFM
organisations in detail tend to have better information about the real-life
situation and contextual factors. There has been an increasing trend in using
local personnel. Personnel from the policy research institutes which grew up
during the nineties have also been used.
The emphasis on diagnostic work has been reinforced by the HIPC and PRSP
initiatives. IFIs require diagnostic reviews of policies as well as management
and procedures. Conditions for aid increasingly deal with processes and
procedures within PFM and a large number of diagnostic tools are being used.
This has increased donors’ insight but put a heavy burden on able public
sector managers, who are a scarce resource in most African countries.
NORAD and Sida have argued for co-ordination with the recipient country in
the lead.
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Design and formulation
The regular use of LFA-type analysis in Sida’s and NORAD’s formulation of
projects has made it easier for stakeholders to analyse problems jointly,
discuss objectives and achieve a shared understanding of expectations. The
improvement in planning and project formulation has not, however, had an
equally favourable effect on implementation. There is often a tendency to
over-plan, which can easily lead to disagreement during implementation.
Capacity problems on the recipient side and the belief, on both sides, that a
good plan can start “tomorrow”, still hamper implementation. Realisation of
the fact that “the long term starts today” is needed.
Implementation
The need for considering PFM as a system and for intervening in all or several
components appears difficult at the implementation stage. Main reasons why
concrete interventions have been concentrating on the individual components
rather than whole systems are that the systemic view is of recent origin and
that the different components are managed by different principals and deal
with cross-cutting issues which are difficult to handle bureaucratically. It is
noted with interest that Tanzania has formulated a comprehensive programme
covering most or all components. Addressing the whole system will require
strong leadership over a long time period.
The study argues that a focus on improvement of routine processes may be
advantageous because it needs less managerial capacity and is easy to monitor.
Analytical processes and tools will tend to need more commitment from
managers and leaders.
On the sequencing of intervention, the study finds that some successful
projects have started at the level of routine core processes. For example, IT
development can usually be done easily. There tends to be little resistance
against the introduction of IT. However, the development of routine processes
usually ends up at a stage where management and analytical processes enter
the picture. Strengthening of management appears important to sustainability
but is the most difficult challenge. A building up of trust and success in
technical matters may be required before managerial problems can be
effectively addressed.
There is a chance that a system will go “back to normal” even if an
intervention on one component is successful. For example an intervention to
build up the audit system will not work in the long run if the political level
does not demand and act on audit reports. “A chain is never stronger than its
weakest link”.
The environment in which a capacity building effort takes place is of
considerable importance for outcomes and impact. In LDCs, the environment
within which PFM capacity building takes place is often disabling rather than
enabling. The analysis of problems, the design of projects and indeed
expectations for outcomes and impact must therefore be built on an awareness
of developments and constraints in the entire economy and society beyond the
public sector. For example, LDC economies are often unstable, which causes
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swings in revenue, in turn creating pressures on the expenditure side. This has
repercussions on the entire budget/planning system, often leading to perpetual
crisis management, which is not a favourable environment for capacity
building.
In their work with PFM support the two donor agencies have observed the
importance of clear political backing for addressing PFM issues. Whereas it
seems clear that “political will” is a necessary precondition for PFM reform it
is, however, not sufficient. Management and the bureaucracy will play a key
role in capacity building. A combination of unwillingness and inability from
that side may obstruct attempts to change and improve systems.
Demand for change, as well as appropriate incentives for those involved in
change processes, are also factors affecting the chance of success. Interest and
involvement from top management must go together with a concern for the
incentives given to people “at the coal face”. Certain matters of importance to
capacity building in the targeted organisations may be decided by other
government bodies or higher levels of government which may then block
change. Whereas legal frameworks may need to change as seen from the PFM
capacity building point of view, the institution responsible for implementing
such change may not have the same interest. Also, whereas it may seem
necessary to give greater incentives for a certain category of scarce PFM skills,
change is held back or blocked by a “Department of Personnel” that, from an
overall point of view, believes that enhancement of conditions for one
particular group may be unjust.
Incentives are also important at higher policy levels. The HIPC initiative and
the introduction of PRSP and budget support has led to a stronger focus on
PFM as an area where conditionalities may be stipulated and has thus taken
PFM matters into the political realm.
The study points out the somewhat paradoxical but important fact that few
activities require capacity to the same extent as capacity building. To solve this
problem, the two donors have, to a certain extent, used TA to carry out
regular duties so that staff may be released to participate in capacity building
activities.
Whereas donors have put pressure on many of the recipient countries to
improve PFM, there has been a rapid development of a large “toolbox” of
new concepts and approaches which to some extent has delayed progress in
implementation. There is now a need for rationalising the toolbox. There is an
undeniable need for joint and co-ordinated approaches. The strong role of the
World Bank in PFM raises the question of the role of bilateral agencies and
the influence of recipient countries.
Finally, the study states the obvious fact that “things take time”. The
experience in PFM projects has mostly been that expectations have been set
too high at the start. PFM projects tend to be thought of as three-year projects
whereas a 25-year perspective would be more appropriate.
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Conclusions
The report concludes with the following ideas and tentative recommendations
that the authors see emerging from their examination of Sida and NORAD
projects as well as other sources of experience.
Take a long view
For PFM systems in most low income countries in sub-Saharan Africa to reach
a level where the country is capable of self-reliantly maintaining and
developing them, we reckon that 15-25 years, rather than 5-10 years is
necessary. This does not mean that all interventions will have to have an
equally long-term focus.
Balance the support between different components of PFM
Experience indicates that the degree of improvement and success of
interventions in one component are limited by the state of play in other
components. It is therefore important to analyse the entire PFM system at the
diagnostic stages and to undertake interventions that are balanced between
components. Such analysis also increases the importance of conducting joint
recipient-donor diagnoses and building a common understanding of project
goals. Whereas analysis is stressed as important, it is also underlined that a
balance has to be struck between getting a project off the ground and
continuing preparatory analysis.
Support the education and training of economists and accountants
Considering the poor supply of these personnel categories in many countries
today, 15 – 25 years for building up a strong professional cadre of
accountants and economists is not an overestimate.
Improve human resource management systems
Human resource management systems in the public sector are often deficient
and rigid. If government attaches great importance to attracting competent
personnel for the various components of PFM, incentives (like salaries and
career opportunities) have to be set to attract the right calibre of personnel.
Institutionalise the dialogue between recipient agencies and donor agencies
Joint (recipient/donor) analysis has been stressed as an important ingredient of
successful PFM capacity building projects during the diagnostic stage. There is
a good case for keeping the same close relationship also during the
implementation stage.
Stick to the “development” perspective
Currently, the Ministry of Finance perspective, however, often steers
interventions to improve PFM. With better macroeconomic management, the
sector perspective (the PFM needs at sector level) has to guide the development
of PFM to gain a strong focus on poverty alleviation and development issues
such as health and education. Perfect macroeconomic management is of
limited value for development if it does not efficiently direct resources to the
priority areas for development.
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Put the recipient government in the lead for joint analysis and intervention
Sida and NORAD have supported development programmes under joint
donor “umbrellas” where the World Bank has often taken the lead. Ideally,
the recipient government should provide leadership.
Support and encourage regional organisations and networks in the PFM field
There are a number of regional and even continental organisations that are
active in PFM capacity building. Both Sweden and Norway have lent support
to one or more of these organisations, thus boosting the competence and
extent of capacity building in Africa.
Consider implementation conditions – they matter
External conditions are important in determining the outputs, outcomes and
impact of PFM interventions. An analysis of the external factors is necessary
to be able to assess the potential success of the project. The study mentions
important factors as e.g.: The level of political will to improve PFM; Degree of
organisational and institutional blockages; Terms and conditions for key staff;
Capacity for capacity building
Link PRSP poverty reduction approaches, budgetary support and PFM
improvement
The twin focus on poverty reduction and “basket” financing has put
particular emphasis on Public Finance Management. The quality of PFM will
be one of the decisive factors in ensuring that policy decisions and agreements
with donors actually lead to a greater flow of public sector resources to
poverty reduction measures.
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1. The Assignment
In the wake of the HIPC initiative, introduction of poverty reduction strategies
and budget support, the international donor community has initiated broad-
based work to develop standards and principles for PFM, tools to assess the
standard of PFM in LDCs and methods for monitoring and following up on
poverty alleviation.
 
 As part of this work, the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA)2 has for some
time focused on improving the effectiveness of support to poverty reduction in
Africa, including budget support. SPA's Task Team on Financial Management
and Accountability is considering various tools (Public Expenditure Reviews,
Country Financial Accountability Assessments, etc.) for assessing the strength of
public financial management. The Task Team is also considering how these
tools might be used to formulate a common programme for improving public
financial management, and how donors might more effectively contribute to
building capacity in public financial management.
The purpose of the present study3, contracted by Sida and NORAD, is briefly to
describe ”…best practice in capacity building in public finance management in
Africa for presentation to SPA´s Technical Group meeting” in early June 2002.
More specifically the paper should:
- “ …summarise the highlights of NORAD’s and Sida´s experience,
including what we believe we have learned, what major issues remain
unresolved, and what challenges we expect in the future”.
- “ …consider NORAD’s and Sida´s experience of trying to take a more
comprehensive approach to public finance management, and any lessons
we might draw from this experience”.
- “ …draw conclusions for how SPA donors might increase their support
to capacity building in public finance management and make the support
more effective.”
The study is based on a review of policy documents and reports prepared by
Sida and NORAD and project documentation of cases selected for the study.
The material studied does not provide the information necessary to draw firm
conclusions as to what constitutes best practice in providing support for the
development of PFM in Africa. Hopefully the observations made and the
conclusions drawn will provide the SPA´s Technical Group with useful
experiences and recommendations for further constructive discussions on future
directions and modalities of support to capacity building in PFM.
                                           
2 The participating organisations are the African Development Bank, the UN Economic
Commission for Africa, the European Commission, OECD/DAC, the IMF, the World Bank,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland.
3 See TOR Annex 5
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2. Conceptual framework
2.1 Public financial management
Public finance management is a broad subject area that can be defined in
different ways depending on the purpose of the definition. As this study will
focus on practical experiences from on-going and completed support in the
field, the definition chosen in this context should be based on the way core
public finance functions are typically organised in governments. Such a
definition has been provided by Brobäck and Sjölander (2001)4. They define
public finance management as a system of five key functions. Each function
comprises several components as shown in the table below. The definition used
in this report differs slight from that of Brobäck and Sjölander. We have added
the function “Governance” and slightly extended the “Planning and Budgeting”
category by adding the elements “Statistics” and “Policy analysis”. Also, we feel
that “Procurement” belongs under the broad definition of PFM and have added
this component under “Payments”.
Functions Components
Governance Parliamentary and Cabinet role in planning, budgeting,
accounting, audit
Planning &
Budgeting
Work plans, multi-year plans (national medium-term plans as
well as PRSPs), one-year plans, annual budgets, multiyear
budgets, poverty strategy, MTFF/MTEF, sector programme,
project planning, recurrent budget, capital/investment budget,
statistics, policy analysis
Accounting Bookkeeping, statistics, operational accounting, quarterly
reports, mid-annual reports, annual final accounts, result
reports, chart of accounts, classification, tracking studies
Payments Tranches, periodicity, payment system, treasury account, bank
statement, liquidity, reconciliation, disbursement audit,
disbursement, payment authorisation, bank account,
procurement
Audit Internal audit, independent audit, own/external audit,
financial/management audit, performance/value-for-money
audit
Revenues Customs/taxes, fees, donations, loans, direct/indirect taxes,
revenue ratio, collection of taxes/fees
By describing public finance management as a system of related components it
follows that reform or development of one component is both conditioned on
the state of other components and will impact on the other components.
                                           
4 Brobäck, U. and Sjölander, S., ‘Programme Support and Public Finance Management, A New
Role for Bilateral Donors in Poverty Strategy Work’, Sida studies no.6, 2001
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2.2 Capacity building
We apply a concept of capacity development akin to the one used by Sida5:
- “ to develop the knowledge and competence of individuals and
organisations,
- to develop organisations and/or systems of organisations, and
- to change and strengthen institutional frameworks in the form of formal
policies and laws and/or other informal norms which stipulate the limits
within which individuals and organisations develop.”
Capacity building in PFM may address the individual level, the organisational
level and the institutional level, i.e. the rules of the game of PFM. PFM, as
defined above, can be described as a set of procedural rules or procedures for
planning, budgeting, accounting etc. Capacity building interventions thus aim at
developing these rules and procedures, organise the work and provide resources
(physical, human, funds) in a way that facilitates their efficient implementation,
and equips people in the organisations with competence to operate efficiently in
accordance with them. The overall aim is to make PFM an efficient tool for
implementing policies and producing services for the benefit of the people, as
well as providing an accountability mechanism through which the government
and the public service can be controlled.
2.3 Results of capacity building
How do the results of capacity building in PFM manifest themselves? For the
purpose of this assignment it may be relevant not to identify results that can be
directly attributed to a particular project or subproject but rather to obtain, if
possible, a picture of the overall efficacy of the PFM system observed.
Brobäck & Sjölander (ibid.) argue for the necessity to set a minimum standard
for a PFM system in the African context. The minimum standard they advocate
requires that:
• “The budget must comprise all relevant resources, or at least these must
be known. The annual budget must be the result of multiyear projections
and reflect the government’s poverty reduction strategy.
 
• The accounts must encompass all resources and be capable of describing
the information in different structures (functional, economic, geographic
and institutional).
 
• Accounting and payment transfers must be part of an automatic and
computerised reconciliation system (cross-checking of book-keeping and
payment registration).
 
• The central payments system must be audited regularly.
                                           
5 See: “Sida´s Policy for Capacity Development as a Strategic Question in Development Co-
operation” Sida, Methods Development Unit, November 2000
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• Payment systems must be computerised to enable daily liquidity
assessments.
• Utilisation of the domestic resources base must increase and be tied to
the financing of donors and lenders of sector programme support and
other programme support associated with institutional development.”
 
 In our view, these requirements should rather be used as goals towards which
support to PFM should strive. Detailed results criteria could and should be
developed for each area.
 
 In this brief study it has not been possible to go into detail about the actual
results of Sida and NORAD projects. However, some general assessments have
been made of the results achieved in the case studies.
CMI
11
3. Overview of Swedish and Norwegian Support to
PFM
3.1 Development of Sida support
 Before the 1980s, Sida assistance to public administration was limited and
consisted of scattered TA efforts, mainly in sector ministries but also in
ministries of planning and finance. Contextual analysis and studies of existing
systems and practices were rarely made as a basis for choice of intervention
strategy.
 
 Not until the early 1980s did Sida start more systematic work on developing its
support for reform and capacity building in public administration. New
modalities of delivering support were introduced. The previous practice of
providing stand-alone Technical Assistance, hired directly by Sida, was
gradually abolished. Instead, public institutions in Sweden were encouraged to
take on projects within their areas of responsibility on commercial terms.
Consulting companies were also invited to engage in the public administration
field. Some of the major state-owned utilities (forestry, energy, telecoms) had
formed subsidiary companies that were contracted for development co-
operation projects. Similarly, some academic institutions had been engaged in
co-operation with sister institutions.
 
 During the 1980s a core group of state agencies developed their capacity to
deliver support, including i.a. the National Audit Bureau, the National Tax
Board, the National Statistics Office and the National Institute for Civil Service
Training and Development. These agencies established consulting offices and
operated their development co-operation projects on commercial terms. The
concept of institutional twinning as a means of institution building was
established by Sida as the main modality in the field of public administration
assistance.
 
The economic crises that hit Africa in the 1980s and the structural adjustment
policies introduced as a means of overcoming the crisis put institutional issues
in focus and in particular the weak capacity of governments and their public
administrations. This development created a need to formulate more
comprehensive guidelines and policies for support in the area and induced Sida
to review its experiences. The book ”Making Governments Work”, published
in 1991, was the first attempt by Sida to review its experiences and to formulate
guidelines for support in the field of public administration. The guidelines
identified a number of central functional areas for which support should be
provided:
“- financial management, including auditing and taxation systems, state
bank organisation and modernisation, and public procurement;
- base services supporting planning work, in particular statistics and
physical planning services;
- public organisation and management development;
CMI
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- development of relevant administrative training capacity;
- local government organisation.”
The main justification for support to these areas was to improve government
efficiency and effectiveness in order for the state to be able to promote
economic and social development in line with the overall objectives for Swedish
development co-operation. The guidelines emphasised the need for thorough
analysis of the context within which support to any particular area was
considered. Participatory approaches in programme/project identification and
formulation were advocated. Emphasis was put on the need to secure recipient
ownership (the concept was not yet widely used). No by-pass project
management arrangement should be allowed and the aim of TA was to
contribute to capacity building and not to do gap-filling in the regular operation
of a recipient organisation. The approach should be one of institution building,
implying long-term support to improving the capacity of recipients in term of
better systems, rules and procedures, organisation and competence. Capacity
building was thus the main aim of support and was assumed to result in
improved efficiency and effectiveness.
 The guidelines provided in 1991 have guided Swedish support for public
administration in practice. Emphasis has been on the priority areas identified
and the advocated support modalities have been implemented. There are no
signs that the main guidelines are to be changed. On the contrary, it seems as if
the experiences of the last decade have reinforced the policies laid down.
However, from the mid 1990s the development agenda has broadened. Other
governance issues such as human rights, the rule of law and democracy have
been put in focus alongside efficiency concerns regarding public administration.
The focus on poverty reduction has revived the importance of redistribution
policies. During the last few years Sida has launched policies on poverty
alleviation; peace, democracy and human rights; gender equality; and the
environment. These policy areas are supposed to be mainstreamed in all
development co-operation. This development has added new areas of co-
operation and has undoubtedly raised the general awareness among aid officials
about the complex relationships that exist and impact on any project or
programme in any of the areas chosen for support.
3.2 General characteristics of Sida support
Contextual analysis
The 1990s has seen a strong development of analytical work preceding project
identification and project formulation.
Types of intervention
Sida has been and still is very clear on the purpose of support to PFM: capacity
building of various kinds, long- and short-term technical assistance, and
provision of resources to enhance technical capacity, especially for investment
in IT and financing of staff development through in-house and institutional
training. There is an awareness of the need to improve managerial capacity.
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Modes of co-operation
In most cases Sida has preferred to arrange institutional co-operation through
twinning between a Swedish organisation and its counterpart in the recipient
country. Since the 1980s, Sida has deliberately encouraged public agencies to
engage in development co-operation. The Swedish Government has accepted
this on condition that the co-operation activities are fully funded. The agencies
within the PFM field have all developed international departments for this
purpose.
Long-term relationships
The typical project is planned for a 2-3 year period but extended to 10 or even
15 years. The institutional co-operation concept includes an assumption that
long-term relationships between institutions and individuals are beneficial to the
effectiveness of the support. There are no examples of Sida terminating support
due to inefficiency on the part of the Swedish institution.
A participatory approach
Sida advocates a participatory approach both in the preparatory phase and in
the way projects are executed. This also implies a considerable readiness on the
part of Sida to be flexible in relation to time frames, project activities and also
funding.
LFA
The introduction of LFA in the mid 1990s has contributed to increased
awareness of the complexities of institutional development. The rather rigid
format of LFA has not stopped Sida from being flexible.
Mix of resources and generous funding of training
All projects use a mix of resource inputs such as long and short-term technical
assistance, funding of investments in training, equipment and physical facilities.
Development of training capacity, direct in-house and institutional training and
other staff development activities are typical interventions in all long-term
projects.
3.3 Development of NORAD support
PFM has not been considered a separate sector of Norwegian development
assistance until recently. This does not mean that PFM capacity building has, in
practice, been left out of Norwegian support to African countries. PFM has
been seen as part of “administrative development”. The importance attached to
administrative development by Norwegian aid authorities has varied over time
for a number of reasons. The needs expressed by co-operating countries have
played a considerable role. Changing paradigms in international development
assistance have also had an effect. The approach to support for PFM and the
amount of resources used for this purpose have also been influenced by the aid
administration’s view of what was expedient in relation to the overall profile of
Norwegian aid. Finally, the emphasis on PFM has been related to the
authorities’ perception of what expertise Norway could best supply.
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Up through the sixties and into the seventies, development assistance strategies
were characterised by “big-push” development plans and concentration on
project aid in a framework of government-to-government support. Recipient
countries called for assistance in running as well as restructuring their
administrations. The overriding paradigm for technical assistance was,
however, based on the idea that the public sector in the newly independent
African countries played much the same role as in industrialised countries. Also,
management systems as well the character of the civil service in African
countries were seen to be largely similar to those of industrial countries. The
developing countries, it was felt, just suffered from a lack of funding for public
service as well as investment. There were also gaps in know-how and lack of
local educated and competent staff. Such gaps could be filled by TA.
This view has been the basis for Norwegian support to administrative
development for many years. Technical assistance personnel in the area of
financial administration came to be deployed as “stand-alone” staff members or
advisers, particularly in the “planning” and “statistics” sectors. It was
considered desirable for Norwegian TA to be clustered around those sectors in
a recipient country where Norway was particularly active as a donor. Hence,
there was an emphasis on advisers in sectors like health, education, fisheries and
energy rather than PFM. Assistance in organisation and management was also
concentrated in the “important” sectors. Rather than taking a broader capacity
building approach, the focus was predominantly on individual “training”.
Norwegian support to financial management very seldom took a systemic
viewpoint.
The “recipient orientation” that became important in Norwegian aid policies
into the 1970s was based on the realisation that the recipient ought to be at the
centre of decision-making and management of development assistance.
Logically, this should have led to an increasing emphasis on capacity building in
financial management but in reality the sixties paradigm held up very well. One
important change that did not occur before well into the eighties was an
increased emphasis on institutional co-operation, or twinning as it was later
called. In the area of PFM, the key institutions in Norway did not respond
strongly to these needs except perhaps the Norwegian Central Bureau of
Statistics.
While Norway had for a time been clearly negative towards donor policies
involving structural adjustment and policy-based conditionality, policies from
the mid-eighties reflected a higher degree of acceptance. Prior to this time, aid
policy had been clearly adverse to close involvement in PFM because of its
sensitivity and the danger of exercising undue policy influence. This barrier now
gradually eroded, however, without changing the policy principle that the
primary responsibility for development management should rest with the
recipient countries themselves. Policy-wise, macroeconomic planning and policy
analysis as well as policies and programmes for sectors became more important
focus areas whereas reliance on the use of experts and consultants as TA
declined.
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In the early nineties NORAD developed a strategy for support to institutional
development. The strategy appeared, first and foremost, to focus on
institutional development because it would make development assistance more
efficient, but it was also recognised that improving institutions in developing
countries was important in itself, independent of aid. The strategy paper argued
that in the past, Norway had often considered it more important to keep to
project deadlines than to assist recipient country institutions to handle key
development issues on a sustainable basis. Greater emphasis on institutional
development was seen as a logical consequence of the increasing trend within
the development assistance community towards programme support rather than
project support.
The key objective for the strategy was for “Norwegian development assistance
to contribute to strengthen the recipient country institutions so that their
functions may be discharged efficiently, independently of foreign support.
Therefore, the aspect of institution building should be integrated in all
significant parts of NORAD’s activities”.
The policy included public sector, research and education, as well as
organisations in the private sector. The strategy also pointed out that a variety
of organisations played a role in democratic development. Therefore, action to
create organisations over a wide range of areas should receive support.
The strategy was not aimed at any specific range of institutions like those
involved in PFM tasks. The selection of priority organisations to be given
support would be based on expressed needs and assessment of development
potential. Also, attention would be given to the quality of the institutional
environment within which the organisation was placed. The strategy thus
reveals a greater understanding than before of the importance of the contextual
factors. Institutional co-operation was mentioned as one important modality.
The trend towards forms of financial aid where a substantial part of
management falls on the recipient (budget support, balance of payment support
or sector support) has been increasing in the nineties, Norway being one of the
countries in the forefront of this development. This, together with the general
emphasis on ownership, participation, good governance and recipient
responsibility has lead to a strong growth in support of various aspects of
financial management. In the late nineties the IMF initiatives on HIPC and
PRFG /PRSP strengthened this trend.
The latest policy statement on PFM support is contained in a NORAD Position
Paper on Direct Budget support6. The statement clearly connects PFM to budget
support but also looks at the general PFM issues as being distinctly linked to the
governance issues: ”Public financial management is unlikely to be completely
satisfactory [in recipient countries]. General direct budget support will not only
allow for a follow-up of the planning and budgetary procedures but also for
discussions about developing democratic institutions, private sector
                                           
6 Position Paper on Direct Budget support, NORAD April 2002
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development, improving tax revenue, reforming public administration, and
about the procedures surrounding the government budget etc. In part, these
could also imply contributing to combating corruption in a goal oriented and
effective manner.”
The statement stresses the participation of Norway in assessments of PFM such
as PERs, CFAAs etc. for two reasons. It is argued that assessments tend to
overlap and thus unnecessarily increase the burden of work on partner
countries. The more important reason emphasised is that participation is a way
of gaining insight into PFM systems, which is necessary for formulating
appropriate reform programmes and capacity building.
3.4 General characteristics of NORAD support
Contextual analysis
Increasingly, weaknesses in PFM is seen in a systemic context. Whereas the
scant analysis done earlier often drew its conclusion on the basis of a “filling
holes” paradigm, NORAD has increasingly adopted a systemic view that also
connects core PFM areas to governance issues. The capacity of NORAD for
carrying out analysis will probably have to be strengthened.
Types of intervention
Whereas the emphasis of Norwegian support for PFM has long been on “stand-
alone” TA, interventions now take a clear general capacity building form with
emphasis on systems and environmental factors as well as training. Normally a
support package will consist of support for institutional reform and capacity
building as well as technical assistance and equipment.
Mode of co-operation
The preferred mode of co-operation in the area of institutional reform is
“twinning”.
A long-term relationship
Whereas support agreements hardly cover more than 2-3 years, it is often
envisaged that the successful conclusion of a project may take a much longer
time and NORAD’s position on the extension of institutional development
programmes is generally positive.
CMI
17
4. Experiences and lessons learned
4.1 The diagnostic phase
4.1.1 Analysis of the system as well as components before the
design phase
The cases reviewed reveal very different levels of preparatory work. Sida as well
as NORAD seems to have accepted the problem definition of the original
requests for support without major alterations or deeper investigations in the
1980s. This was the case with support to budget management in Tanzania and
to some extent regarding the support to auditing in Botswana. The Sida project
in Mozambique also started with its objectives set for a three year period that
are far from reached after 14 years of support.
The preparation of the Sida project to build up the external auditing function in
Mozambique has on the other hand been a very lengthy process. Still the
appraisal team found the project proposal overly ambitious and unrealistic.
Whereas comprehensive analysis of project preconditions is undeniably the right
way of approaching institutional and organisational development, such analysis
cannot include all relevant aspects or identify all possible obstacles. This is due
to the nature of organisational development. Typically a project creates
awareness of new problems and knowledge among stakeholders as it proceeds.
There is therefore a balance to be struck between getting a project off the
ground and continuing preparatory analysis. In LDCs, where very often the
capacity to see the implications of a future desirable state of affairs is limited
among many of the stakeholders, it might be better to take off and address new
problems as they emerge.
4.1.2 Awareness of needs – managerial and technical
A thorough preparatory analysis can contribute significantly to awareness
raising not only on the recipient side but also on the side of the donor agency.
Awareness of a problem is a prerequisite for action but does not necessarily lead
to action. The development of management and leadership skills is still not
given much priority. Management training and development of corporate
planning constituted significant interventions in Sida’s tax administration
project but also, in this case, only after technical issues had been in focus for a
few years. NORAD has focused management in only a few cases, such as the
support for CSRP in Tanzania.
The concentration of effort on technical issues – systems development and
professional training – is typical for all projects. Aspects of the NORAD
support to the Auditor General in Zambia were indicative of this bias. The
“soft” aspects of organisational development have not featured prominently.
Awareness of the need to address those issues emerges as a project is being
implemented. But they are difficult to bring into the dialogue between the
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project parties and obviously difficult to address. The reason is that these issues
are sensitive and threatening and difficult to handle, especially before
substantial trust has been built between the parties.
This is a general experience of institutional twinning projects that has been
confirmed by the reviewed projects, although the twinning model is assumed to
have the advantage of facilitating an organisational development approach in
which all relevant aspects should be addressed.
4.1.3 Participation of “insiders” at the diagnostic stage
At the diagnostic stage, as at the design and formulation stage, much of the
analysis and planning for interventions in PFM capacity building have come
from international experts. Lately, however, donors like Sida and NORAD have
started to engage more local personnel for such tasks. Local consultants tend to
have much better information both about the real life situation and the
contextual factors.
Experience with using local consultants is good and could be extended. In
several countries there are now professionals who have worked inside “the
system” that may be called on. Also, there is increasing scope for engaging
researchers with appropriate background from the policy research institutions
that have grown up in the nineties.
4.1.4 Effects of new trends in IFI lending and diagnostic work
For countries that benefit from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
initiative and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) / Poverty Reduction
and Growth Facility (PRGF), the IFIs require diagnostic reviews that involve
both policies and management/procedures. For HIPC, the two tracking
exercises conducted so far have included considerations of the soundness of the
PFM systems in those countries. PRSP/PRGF contain procedural
conditionalities for a participatory process involving civil society and
development partners, as well as proper reporting on use of funds for poverty
alleviation.
The World Bank has, over the last decade, introduced several new diagnostic
tools, which include exercises such as the Public Expenditure Review (PER),
Country Procurement Assessment Review (CPAR), Country Financial
Accountability Assessment (CFAA), and the Institutional and Governance
Review (IGR). The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability project
(PEFA) has support from DFID, EU, and World Bank. The project will review
all diagnostic instruments.
The PFM “conditions” attached to the HIPC and PRSP/PRGF and the
diagnostic tools have clearly increased donors’ insight into and focus on
financial management. But for the recipient administration the burden of work
has increased. Public sector managers, who are a scarce resource in most
African countries, face an increasing burden in satisfying requirements for more
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and more information and analyses by different donors and involving different
(and often overlapping) diagnostic tools. It has now become imperative for
donors to be involved in joint and co-ordinated analyses and aid operation. Sida
and NORAD have long been encouraging co-ordination with the recipient
country in the lead. If progress in this area is too slow, it may endanger the
trend towards placing management responsibility with aid recipients.
4.2 Design and formulation
4.2.1 The fragility of joint understanding and shared visions in LFA
documents
LFA has brought more thorough analysis into project formulation and it has
created an opportunity for stakeholders to jointly analyse problems and discuss
objectives and means to achieve those objectives. It is a tool for the project
parties to calibrate expectations and to reach a shared understanding. An
agreed project document may still not serve as a guide in the day-to-day
implementation. The difficulty is to translate long-term objectives into short-
term action plans. There is always a tendency to believe that you can start to-
morrow instead of to day when a long-term objective is to be addressed. The
low appreciation of the fact that “the long term starts to-day” has impeded
implementation. This is naturally also linked to the absorptive capacity of the
recipient party.
4.3 Implementation
4.3.1 Scope of intervention
PFM components addressed
None of the projects reviewed seem to have been considered within the wide
framework of PFM as defined in chapter 2. Instead, individual components
have been addressed. This can be explained by the fact that it is only during
recent years that PFM has been seen as a system in itself with interdependent
components. All concerned parties are probably ready to agree that a systems
approach to PFM development is required. But the components are managed by
different principals and cross-cutting issues are very difficult to address in any
bureaucracy. For practical purposes, this approach is difficult to maintain as
people at the implementing level seldom have the necessary overview, power or
legitimacy to act across organisational borders. Different organisational
interests are likely to limit the feasibility of a systems approach in practice. It is
therefore interesting to note that the Government of Tanzania has now
formulated a comprehensive PFM development programme which includes
components on continued development of the integrated financial management
system, auditing and revenue. The ambition to address the whole system of
organisations involved in PFM will require strong leadership over a long period
of time.
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High specificity routine processes versus analytical processes
Efficiency of routine processes can be more easily monitored and predetermined
rules and procedures require less of managerial capacity. Development of
analytical processes and tools require active and persistent demand from
decision-makers at all levels and committed and skilled leadership.
This may explain the rather successful Sida tax administration project in
Zimbabwe. The project addressed routine administrative processes and used IT
to rationalise work. This may also contribute towards explaining the rather
unsuccessful initial budget projects in Tanzania and Mozambique, where
analytical processes were addressed to start with.
A chain is never stronger than its weakest link
It is possible that a persistent and successful focus on one part of the system will
retract when interventions have ended because of the influence of lower
development in other parts. This means that one should frequently consider the
whole system, even if interventions only concern parts of it.
This observation has been amply illustrated in the cases reviewed. For example:
the off-budget resources in both Tanzania and Mozambique undermine the
effectiveness of the budget and the possibilities of tracking actual expenditure.
The poor accounting at district level contributes to the same weakness. If the
political system does not demand and act on audit reports, the whole audit
system is weakened. The evaluation of the Norwegian support for Audit in
Zambia spells this out clearly.
A systems approach is called for. But even if such approach is applied, the time
horizons for achieving results in various components differ substantially. To roll
out the integrated financial management system to all districts in Tanzania will
take more time than it has taken to develop and implement the system at central
level (6 years). The case is the same in Mozambique. In Mozambique the
external audit function has no, or very little, capacity to undertake the regular
audits it is supposed to carry out. Even if it had the capacity, the government
agencies that are supposed to be audited would be unable to deliver final
accounts in time for meaningful audits to be done.
4.3.2 Sequencing of intervention
Get core routine processes in order
A general observation is that it is necessary and even easier to get core routine
processes in order before analytical processes can be successfully addressed. So
it seems wise to start with accounting and progress towards budgeting and
planning and not the other way around as was done in Tanzania and
Mozambique. Start with financial audit and progress to performance audit.
Unless a proper accounting system is in operation, financial as well as
performance auditing become less relevant.
Computerisation offers a powerful tool to address core routine processes. There
is little resistance to introducing IT. However, IT development eventually
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reaches a stage where management of maintenance and renewal enters the scene
and analytical processes and management capability become important for
sustainability.
Technical capacity is not enough
The quality of corporate management is a key factor for sustainability. Unless
leadership and managerial capabilities are sufficiently strong, sustainability is
threatened. This has been shown in the cases of Namibia and Zimbabwe, in
particular in the tax project. The strong Accountant General entering the scene
in 1996 in Tanzania was crucial for the positive development that took place.
However, development of managerial capacity is the most difficult challenge
and not always recognised as a key issue by those who are directly concerned. A
building up of trust and success in technical matters may therefore be required
before managerial capacity problems are addressed.
4.4 Implementation conditions
4.4.1 Environmental factors
Disabling environment
In LDCs the environment within which PFM is to be improved is disabling
rather than enabling. We have pointed to a number of systemic factors posing
obstacles to speedy development. In this perspective, it is probably wise not to
raise expectation too high. No sector or system can sustainably operate at a
much higher level of efficiency and rationality than the environment in which it
is located. This calls for “comprehensive comprehensiveness”. It is not enough
just to include all aspects of PFM in the analysis but to widen the analysis to
include public sector reform and the mechanisms in the society that discipline
the public sector and provide the incentives for its performance. Everything has
to be taken into account. But this insight must not be mixed up with a central
planning approach. We have said above that it is impossible to attempt to
capture all prerequisites for development of PFM before action is taken.
Poverty
Apart from systemic problems, it is important to realise that a typical LDC has
an unstable economy, often dependent on only one or a few raw materials with
fluctuating prices. The swings in revenue lead to strong pressures, spreading
from the budget/planning level and thus upsetting other parts of the system,
leading to crisis management.
The chronic state of crisis management is also a result of the low level of
available resources in LDCs. Lack of resources in terms of money, information,
equipment, infrastructure and personnel of the right quality reduces the number
of alternative ways available to accomplish a task or solve a problem.
Abundance of resources reduces uncertainty by making alternative courses of
action available. Lack of resources also reduces the margin within which
mistakes can be corrected before damage is caused.
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4.4.2 Political will”
Something happened in the mid-1990s in Tanzania and Mozambique that
seems to have had a profound impact on their political willingness to address
PMF issues. Both in Tanzania and in Mozambique the pace of reform increased,
most markedly in Tanzania. The cases on Tanzania described in Annexes 1 and
2 amply show this. The main reason behind the change in Tanzania was a
change in political leadership coupled with the economic and moral crises into
which the previous regime had brought the country. If political will is a
necessary precondition for public sector and PFM reform, it is, however, not
sufficient. The political leadership also has to be able to create a readiness for
change in the bureaucracy. How well the political leadership is able to fuel and
maintain readiness for reform is a key factor for successful reform in areas that
require sustained effort over long periods.
Willingness to change and develop is usually taken for granted when the
political leadership or top management has approved or supports changes in a
certain direction. This is, however, not true in most bureaucracies. A
combination of unwillingness and inability can obstruct any attempt to change.
The simple model below illustrates four situations a project might face.
                         Job readiness
Able Unable
Willing I II
Unwilling III IX
The four-field table above enables us to examine the readiness for change in
more depth. If we look at field I, we find that both willingness and ability exist.
This is an ideal situation, in which the organisation is likely to implement
change by itself.
In field II the willingness exists but the organisation is unable to carry out
change. However, as the willingness is there the organisation will start to learn
to do so itself and it may call in external expertise to help solve the problems.
An organisation that is able but unwilling, as in field III, needs to be subject to
external pressure or impulses to change its psychological readiness. An
organisation that is neither willing nor capable can only change through
external influence. External pressure might create a situation where the
organisation starts to search for ways to reduce the pressure. The powerful
actors in the organisation may start a learning process that brings it into field II.
If this does not happen, the organisation will most like deteriorate further and
eventually disappear.
Pshycological readiness
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Several observations made during our examination of cases (Annex 1 and 2)
could be analysed by applying the above model. Examples are the fact that no
restructuring has yet taken place as regards the accounting cadre in Tanzania
and the observation that the agreed and learnt procedures for financial audit
were not implemented in Botswana. In these cases the organisations are in the
third field. Tanzania moved from field four to field two in 1996 in PFM, which
facilitated progress with the accounting project.
4.4.3 Demand and incentives
The necessity of top management involvement
The cases also illustrate the necessity of top management involvement in the
development process. The case of auditing in Zambia finds more top level
contact between the co-operating partners to be desirable. The case of
accounting in Tanzania is striking. But the successful audit projects in Namibia
and Zimbabwe, as well as the tax administration project in Zimbabwe, also
show the importance of committed and active leadership of the recipient
organisations.
Organisational and institutional blockages
All cases illustrate the existence of blockages to development of different kinds.
A typical problem is that certain matters of importance for the targeted
organisation are decided by other government bodies or by government itself or
by Parliament. The salary issue, which has featured in the documentation of
most projects is a case in point. But staff establishment and schemes of service
are also prominent issues, as shown in the case of auditing in Zambia. In LFA
terminology, these types of issues may be called killing factors. However, in
both Mozambique and Tanzania salary enhancement schemes are funded by
Sida and have obviously, in the Tanzania case, disarmed salary as a potential
killing factor for the time being.
Reform of the legal framework has obviously had a great impact on
development in Tanzania and in Mozambique. It was also a prerequisite for
introducting performance auditing in Zimbabwe.
The difficulty in changing organisational structures is often mentioned as an
issue that impedes progress because other government bodies have a decisive
power to block or delay proposed changes. In Tanzania, the Accountant
General succeeded in restructuring his own office but failed with the accounting
departments of the ministries. In Zimbabwe the Auditor General tried to gain
more autonomy but failed. In the Tax Department in Zimbabwe the need to
reorganise as a consequence of computerisation succeeded.
The salary issue
The introduction of “local cost compensation”, the term used for salary
enhancement paid by donors, obviously had a very strong effect on the ability
of the Tanzanian Accountant General´s department to recruit, retain and
demand performance of the staff. This was probably, together with the renewal
of staff, reorganisation of the department and a strong Accountant General, a
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decisive factor explaining the fast progress that was made once the political will
was re-established. Low salaries are frequently mentioned in projects reviewed
as a potential killing factor for all development. Weak incentives to perform
regular duties and no incentives to engage in risky development activities
characterise the condition counterpart staff are working under in the poorest
countries. The situation is different in Botswana and Namibia. In the poorest
countries there is an enormous difference in efficiency, commitment and interest
between staff of the Central Banks and those of the Treasury/Finance, because
central banks have their own salary schemes and the possibility to finance them.
Salary enhancement schemes, which are financed by the donors, are
unsustainable in the long run. But so are many other investments by donors,
e.g. budget and sector programme support, unless economic growth enables the
country eventually to become self-financing. The main problem with salary
enhancement is political. How can the politicians defend systems where certain
categories of staff are singled out and given privileges that others cannot get?
HIPC and PRSP conditionality, sector programmes and bilateral budget support
It is likely that both the HIPC initiative and the introduction of PRSPs and
budget support function as both stick and carrot to step up reforms in PFM in
Tanzania and Mozambique. Reforms of PFM have become an issue involving
the top political leadership whereas before it was an issue that at most attracted
some interest at permanent secretary level. The current move towards budget
support and sector programme funding also acts as an incentive to reform the
PFM system.
4.4.4 Capacity for capacity building
The problem of capacity to build capacity is most striking in Mozambique
where the absence of qualified staff is absolute. With the old gap-filling
modality long since put on the shelf, this problem is a real obstacle to fast
progress. Tribunal Administrativo in Mozambique does not have the capacity
to fulfil its statutory obligations and even less capacity to involve itself in
development activities parallel to the regular work. An independent appraisal
team suggested that the Tribunal should be assisted to carry out its regular
duties by auditors provided by the project. Although this contravenes the
philosophy of the twinning model and the advisory role of technical assistance
personnel that is the only accepted role nowadays, Sida has agreed to support
the regular operations of the Tribunal.
The budget and accounting projects in Mozambique have had a strong presence
of international advisors and the same is true for the audit projects. In addition,
a substantial amount of short-term consultancy has been provided. These big
inputs reflect the limited local capacity both within the institutions but also on
the local labour market.
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4.4.5 Donor behaviour
In the reviewed projects there is little evidence of overlapping or competing
projects funded by different donors. But donor pressure on the countries to
improve PFM has grown in recent years. Donors typically have manifold
demands as to how recipient countries should run to the jump. The fast
development of new concepts and approaches may be an excuse for not
jumping at all but to continue training for the run.
The work in the donor community to develop standards and tools in PFM is
very positive provided the present toolbox is rationalised and used jointly by the
recipient country and the donors represented in the country in question. A
parallel could be drawn to the strong conditionality that the European Union is
imposing on candidate countries in eastern and central Europe.
The strong position of the World Bank in the PFM area raises the question of
the role of the bilateral agencies in project implementation. There is an
undeniable need for joint and co-ordinated approaches among the whole donor
community and with the partner government in analysing pre-conditions and
diagnosing development needs as well as co-ordinating interventions.
4.4.6 Things take time
After 15 years of support neither Tanzania nor Mozambique meet the minimum
standards referred to in chapter 2 or the standards set by the World Bank’s 15
indicators. Performance audit is weak in the countries where it has been
introduced. The fate of tax administration in Zimbabwe is unknown.
Donor and recipient expectations are mostly too high from the start. We tend to
think in terms of three-year projects whereas a 25-year perspective would be
more appropriate.
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5. Conclusions
At the present stage it is hardly prudent to draw strong general conclusions
about capacity building in the area of PFM. The sections below briefly set out
ideas and tentative recommendations that the authors see emerging from their
examination of Sida and NORAD project as well as other sources of
experience.
Take a long view
Despite considerable efforts to improve PFM systems by African countries and
donors alike, this study finds that none of the countries analysed have reached a
minimum standard such as the one suggested by e.g. Brobäck and Sjölander7.
This is not necessarily because the capacity building efforts have been in vain.
Considering all components and the immense need for change and improvement
as well as the external factors (like the minimal supply of trained local
professionals) that keep progress back, it is easily realised that reaching the
appropriate standard will take a long time. For PFM systems in most low
income countries in sub-Saharan Africa to reach a level where the country is
capable of self-reliantly maintaining and developing them, we reckon 15-25
years, rather than 5-10 years is necessary. This does not mean that all
interventions will have to have an equally long-term focus. Worthwhile
improvements may of course be attained in the short and medium term.
However, short- and medium-term interventions will often not cover the whole
system, with the attendant danger that improvement achieved in one
component will be lost if not followed up in the rest of the system.
Balance the support between different components of PFM
The donors’ approach to PFM capacity shortages in the seventies and eighties
was stand-alone Technical Assistance (TA). Sida and NORAD have increasingly
taken a capacity building approach, comprising individual training and
organisational improvement as well as attention to institutional frameworks. In
line with this, the focus has changed from a concentration on individual
components of PFM (budgeting, accounting, auditing etc) to a systemic view
that takes into account the interfaces between components and considers their
interdependence. Experience indicates that the degree of improvement and
success of interventions in one component are limited by the state of play in
other components. It is therefore important to undertake interventions that are
balanced between components. There is some evidence that an early focus on
basic routine processes, such as accounting, will yield results and also over time
can spill over into analytical processes where it is inherently much more difficult
to intervene.
The attention to systemic issues may, however, be taken too far. It is stressed
that a comprehensive approach is important in the diagnostic phase. In the
implementation phase, however, it clearly may prevent action. A balance has to
be struck between getting a project off the ground and continuing preparatory
analysis.
                                           
7 See section 2.3 above
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A more comprehensive approach increases the importance of conducting joint
recipient-donor diagnoses and building a common understanding of project
goals. Without a strong interest in changing systems and improving components
from the recipient, projects tend be handicapped from the start.
Support the education and training of economists and accountants
The long view is particularly important when the supply of local professionals
(particularly economists and accountants) has to be increased. In parallel with
the educational measures, support to short-term job-oriented training will also
be necessary. It is necessary not only to equip staff with the necessary academic
background. Considerable job experience and good track records are essential
for individuals who take on the very serious responsibilities in PFM. It will also
be necessary to build up capacity for capacity building. Considering the tenuous
situation in many countries today, 15 – 25 years for building up a strong
professional cadre of accountants and economists is not an overestimate.
Improve human resource management systems
Human resource management systems in the public sector are often deficient
and rigid. There is little flexibility in giving particular incentives to categories of
staff that are either in short supply or seen as particularly important. In many
cases, capacity building efforts in the public sector do not improve the
bureaucracy, simply because those civil servants who have been taking part in
training leave for higher paid jobs in the parastatals, central banks and the
private sector as soon as they have completed their training. If government
attaches great importance to attracting competent personnel for the various
components of PFM, incentives (like salaries and career opportunities) have to
be set to attract the right calibre of personnel. A number of donors have tried to
run supplementary salary schemes for particularly important groups in PFM,
with varying success. The argument against such schemes is that they are not
sustainable, but nor are a good many measures and projects implemented for
“development”.
Institutionalise the dialogue between recipient agencies and donor agencies
Joint (recipient/donor) analysis has been stressed as an important ingredient of
successful PFM capacity building projects during the diagnostic stage. There is a
good case for keeping the same close relationship also during the
implementation stage. In particular an emphasis on joint learning about best
practices in designing and managing organisational development processes is
likely to yield results. Studies and research may often play an important role in
spurring the dialogue.
Stick to the “development” perspective
HIPC and budget support have put PFM in focus. In a poverty reduction
perspective, the results on the ground are all important. Currently, the Ministry
of Finance perspective, however, often steers interventions to improve PFM.
This may have been correct during a period when macroeconomic imbalances
were acute. With better macroeconomic management, the sector perspective
(the PFM needs at sector level) has to guide the development of PFM to gain a
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strong focus on poverty alleviation and development issues such as health and
education. Perfect macroeconomic management is of limited value for
development if it does not efficiently direct resources to the priority areas for
development. Strong PFM systems are indispensable in making sure that
resources are used efficiently where they are most needed and in line with
overall political priorities.
Put the recipient government in the lead for joint analysis and intervention
Sida and NORAD have supported development programmes under joint donor
“umbrellas” where the World Bank has often taken the lead. It is felt that this
joint programmatic approach is an important departure. Working jointly,
donors will have to co-ordinate their efforts and are less often left to implement
individual and possibly counterproductive and overlapping approaches. It is,
however, not necessarily the case that the leadership of such groups will have to
be provided by the IFIs. Ideally, the recipient government should provide
leadership. Bilateral partners may be as efficient under such an umbrella as any
other arrangement in providing the required support. There is, however, a limit
to the emphasis on joint approaches. It is important not to see co-ordination as
an end in itself so that it prevents valuable bilateral projects and institutional
co-operation.
Support and encourage regional organisations and networks in the PFM field
There are a number of regional and even continental organisations that are
active in PFM capacity building. Examples of such organisations are the Eastern
and Southern African Association of Accountants General (ESAAG), the
Southern African Development Community Organisation of Supreme Audit
Institutions (SADCOSAI), the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF)
and the Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute for Southern and
Eastern Africa (MEFMI). Both Sweden and Norway have lent support to one or
more of these organisations, thus boosting the competence and extent of
capacity building in Africa.
Consider implementation conditions – they matter
A capacity building project focusing any of the PFM components will be
influenced by conditions that are external to the project. External conditions are
important in determining the outputs, outcomes and impact of the intervention.
An analysis of the external factors is necessary to be able to assess the potential
success of the project. No sector or system can sustainably operate at a much
higher level of efficiency and rationality than the environment within which it is
located. The chance for a successful PFM capacity building project will be
influenced by:
 the level of political will to improve PFM
 The existence of a chronic state of crisis management created by a desperate
lack of resources
 The degree of top-level management involvement
 Degree of organisational and institutional blockage
 Terms and conditions for key staff
 Incentives at the political level
 Capacity for capacity building
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 Donor behaviour and co-ordination, pressure and incentives from donors
Link PRSP poverty reduction approaches, budgetary support and PFM
improvement
Poverty reduction is a focus for development that has long been strongly
emphasised by the international community, with a particularly strong
resonance in the Nordic countries. PRSP approaches to poverty reduction stress
national ownership of poverty policies and use of national systems for
implementation. Increasingly, ODA has therefore taken the form of budgetary,
macro or sector-wide support where donors are much less involved in
implementation than under traditional project approaches. The twin focus on
poverty reduction and “basket” financing has put particular emphasis on Public
Finance Management. The quality of PFM will be one of the decisive factors in
ensuring that policy decisions and agreements with donors actually lead to a
greater flow of public sector resources to poverty reduction measures. Sida and
NORAD are more and more seizing on the potential of PFM for poverty
alleviation by linking PFM improvement to budgetary support. This is done
both through PFM being part of conditionality and through support to capacity
building and reform of PFM systems.
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Annex 1: Sida Experiences
1. Introduction
 The inventory made of Sida-supported projects in PFM shows that such projects
are ongoing or have recently been finished in 10 Eastern and Southern African
countries (see Annex 3 below).
 
 In terms of PFM components, long-term projects (5 years and more) have been
carried out or are currently being carried out in each of the components. There
have been major long-term projects in the field of planning and budgeting and
accounting in Tanzania and Mozambique and in South Africa at provincial
level. Long-term projects in external audit have been conducted in Botswana,
Namibia and Zimbabwe and are currently being conducted in Mozambique and
Rwanda. In Mozambique the internal audit function is also supported. Revenue
agencies are currently supported in South Africa and Tanzania and were during
the 1990s supported in Zimbabwe.
 
2. Planning, budgeting and accounting
 
 This description of support to planning, budgeting and accounting will focus on
Mozambique and Tanzania as Sida’s support to these countries has a long
history and will, most likely, continue for many years to come.
2.1. Mozambique
Swedish support to the Ministry of Finance in Mozambique started in 1988
with the long-term aim of developing a budget system, competence in financial
policy- and decision-making and control of public services financed by the state
budget. The aim for the immediate three-year period was to “develop and
implement a central budget and accounting system that would include all state
revenue and expenditure and integrate recurrent and capital expenditure in a
consolidated state budget”.
At the start of the project the situation had the following characteristics:
- The budget was divided into a recurrent budget and an investment/capital
budget with divided responsibility between Ministry of Finance (MoF) and
the Planning Commission.
- The accounting system (from 1902) only captured about 20% of the total
state expenditures.
- Annual accounts for the state had not been presented since 1975.
- The budget that the Government and the Parliament approved only showed
some salaries, recurrent expenses and subventions. The investment
programme was decided separately and was assumed to be financed by
external sources.
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After initial fact-finding and analysis lasting 1.5 years, a proposal to introduce a
new modern accounting system was presented by the consultant. The proposal
met resistance from the MoF leadership. The MoF wanted to make the existing
system functional and improve on that system. The introduction of a new
system was regarded as too risky given the low level of accounting competence
throughout the whole state administration. Independent consultants were hired
by Sida to assess the situation. The conflicting views on the future strategy
eventually led to the consultant being replaced by the Swedish National Audit
Bureau (NAB), as partner to the MoF. At that time the NAB was responsible
for financial management in the Swedish government. Added components on
internal audit, training and IT complemented the previous focus on budget and
accounting systems issues.
During the following years much effort was devoted to improving the existing
budget process, initial computerisation and build up of the MoF training
department. Efforts were also made to document accounting routines and clean
up the chart of accounts as well as to close the annual state accounts for
previous years.
A modern Budget Frame Law was adopted by the Parliament in 1997, the same
year as the project entered into its third phase. During this phase the first
priority of the project was to get the existing accounting system functioning to
allow for the general state accounts to be prepared according to the Law. The
first annual general accounts (1999) were presented to Parliament in the year
2000. In 2002 a Public Finance Administrative Law was enacted and
regulations are now being drafted.
A second priority was to have the state budget submitted to parliament in
accordance with the Law. This was done for the year 1998 although not all the
requirements of the Law were met, e.g. foreign aid was largely outside the
budget. This is still the case in 2002.
A third priority was to have a consolidated computerised accounting system
developed and implemented. So far the compilation and production of the
consolidated state accounts have been computerised.
A fourth priority was to develop the organisational structure of the budgeting
area, introduce results-based management, develop the organisational structure
of public accounting and introduce performance auditing. The Ministry of
Finance and the Planning Commission were merged by 1994 and in 1996
internal reorganisation took place. The counterpart of the project moved to the
Directorate for Public Accounting.
During the third phase, little emphasis was put on the budgeting component.
The World Bank addressed this area by introducing a mid-term financial
framework and DFID is currently assisting in modernising the planning and
budgeting system.
CMI
33
Due to reorganisation of NAB in 1998, and the creation of the Swedish Finance
Management Authority, the latter institution took over the co-operation in the
field of budgeting and accounting whereas NAB remained executor of the
internal auditing component.
In 2000 the Swedish Finance Management Authority decided to finish its
institutional co-operation with MoF due to internal policy reasons. Through
tender a new consultant (SIPU International) took over the management of the
project in mid 2001.
In 2001 a decision was taken to introduce a new accounting system to be
modelled on the lines of the UN system for classifying government functions
(COFOG). The new accounting model will allow for double entry bookkeeping
and accrual accounting. The project is now consolidating the achievements of
the current system and undertaking preparatory work for development and
implementation of the new model. A number of parallel development processes
are now on-going. As mentioned above, the planning and budgeting system is
being modernised. EU is funding a project to improve the treasury system.
Mozambique benefits from debt relief under the HIPC initiative, a poverty
reduction programme is implemented and substantial budget support is
provided. The developments in these areas, which started in the mid 1990s,
have had a strong influence on the development of PFM in recent years both in
terms of demand for improvement and in terms of setting standards for type of
improvement required.
The project’s capacity building interventions have been directed towards
systems development (principles, rules, procedures documented through
normative documents and manuals), strengthening the organisation and
resources of concerned entities (structures and staffing and IT) of MoF, and
substantial amounts of training, including development of training capacity in
the Ministry. It is estimated that about 3000 finance management staff have
received training.
Technical assistance in the form of long-term advisors (currently 5 international
advisors) and substantial inputs of short-term consultants have been provided,
together with equipment and funds for local expenses. More than SEK 100
million has been invested so far.
Despite the substantial support provided over the last 14 years, which was
intensified from 1997 when other donors also entered the scene, Mozambique
does not meet any of the minimum standard requirements of a PFM system
listed above. In its memo assessing the project dated December 2000, Sida
estimated that another 5-7 years of support was required to implement the new
accounting system.
2.2. Tanzania
Sida has been funding three fairly large projects in the Ministry of Finance in
Tanzania. In 1985 support to build up training in tax administration started
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and in 1986 a project to strengthen budget management commenced. In 1994 a
project to improve the government’s accounts started.
Both the tax administration and budget management projects commenced at a
time when Tanzania was in deep economic crises and when a process of
structural adjustment and transition to a market economy had just started.
There was great uncertainty about the direction of reform and the decisiveness
of the Government in pursuing the reform agenda pushed by the World Bank,
IMF and the donors. The tax administration project succeeded in building up
the physical facilities of the tax administration institute as well as in creating
and conducting a number of in-service training courses. However, the
Government was not able or willing to provide the funds required to run the
institute and the project was phased out in 1993.
The budget management projects succeeded in preparing a handbook that, for
the first time, provided a comprehensive description of the existing system. The
project provided training for a large number of budget officers in ministries and
regional administrations. Computerisation of the compilation of both recurrent
and development budgets was done as well as substantial work to assist in the
development of the so-called Rolling Plan and Forward Budget (a forerunner to
the MTEF now prepared). However, the achievements were meagre and the
reform climate was characterised by a low level of commitment on the part of
Government and high level officials of MoF and the then Planning Commission.
The project was phased out during 1996.
Already in the early 1990s, Sida was approached by the Accountant General of
the MoF requesting support to strengthen the accounting function. Compared
to the preparatory work preceding the initiation of the tax administration and
the budget management project, the GADP (Government Accounts
Development Project) was more thoroughly prepared. In a pre-project phase in
1993/94, thorough studies were made of the accounting system and the
expenditure management framework and the human resource situation. The
minimum standard requirements of a PFM system, described above, were far
from being met. In addition, political and managerial accountability was
limited, legislation outdated, the level of understanding and compliance at all
levels with legislation, regulations and systems was low and not enforced, the
professional skills of demotivated and demoralised staff were poor, and there
was insufficient demand for the production of accurate, complete and timely
financial information. The Government was not in a position to provide an
accurate, complete and transparent account of its financial position to
Parliament, taxpayers, donors and other stakeholders.
The first phase of the project spanned a two-year period from mid 1994 to mid
1996, reflecting cautiousness on the part of Sida. It was later extended to
December 1996. A second phase was implemented over 1997-1999 and
extended twice to the end of 2001.
In the first phase the project concentrated on a number of preparatory activities.
Capacity building activities included the establishment of a Systems
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Development Unit and development of an initial IT strategy, including
installation of a LAN at the Accountant General´s Offfice. Eventually the LTA
succeeded in persuading the Accountant General and the permanent secretary of
MoF to recruit three permanent staff and 10 young graduates from the School
of Accountancy to staff the SDU. The staff worked part-time on systems
development. A salary enhancement scheme was introduced. Together with
other staff the SDU staff were sent for 15 months part-time training in IT and a
series of other training activities took place, including workshops. A review was
made of the organisation and job descriptions.
Financial systems development activities included legislative review, a review of
the chart of accounts, development and installation of a central payments
system and installation of an Access based exchequer management system. The
need for a central payment system was established and accepted during 1995
and was installed in four ministries in July 1996 and for another 10 ministries
in January 1997.
Following the general elections in 1995 and the installation of the new
Government, a new Accountant General, with a background in the Bank of
Tanzania, was appointed. The new Accountant General immediately started to
reorganise the Office along more functional lines. Competitive recruitment was
used to fill posts in the new organisation. The aim was to retrench about 50%
of existing staff. The Accountant General was able to pursue his restructuring
plan despite limited or no support from the MoF.
The financial management systems development also gained momentum during
1996, partly as a result of the new Accountant General and partly as a result of
the new Government’s resolve to address the severe problems of public finance.
A number of key appointments were made in the MoF and a decision was made
to set up a new Tanzania Revenue Authority. These changes were part of the
Government’s aim to restore confidence in the finance management system and
to pave the way for renewed support from the IFIs and the bilateral donors,
who had withheld their non-project aid grants. The introduction of the central
payment system had immediate effects on cash control. The efficiency of the
payment system improved as well as financial reporting. The LTA of the project
has summarised the experiences:
· “Pursue a number of early change methodologies in the area of capacity
building and systems development at a fairly low level of investment and
risk.
· Use general low risk (limited impact on organisational realities/interests)
systems (spreadsheets, word processing) to act as a bridge/introduction for
the introduction of more challenging data processing systems.
· Build the capacity of financial management and IT among staff and
managers to operate and manage computerised financial systems.
· Learn how to implement the necessary organisational reforms required to
successfully implement IT based solutions in the area of financial
management at a low level of sophistication.”
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A second phase started in early 1997 with the specific aim of introducing an
Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) in Dar-es-Salaam and the
development of the Public Debt Management Unit.
The preparatory activities included a financial systems needs assessment, the
establishment of a user group, and a review of the current IT framework. A
local consultant did an analysis of the implications of procuring an IFMS, a
functional specification of the system was done and a thorough procurement
process was carried out as well as an analysis of staff requirements and
recruitment. Through competitive recruitment, 20 young staff were recruited on
a contractual basis. Remuneration of the staff was to be paid from the local cost
compensation budget of the project. Based on the software solution chosen,
training of staff was organised and technical specifications for hardware
investments were made and hardware procured.
Business process analysis was conducted to determine how the various financial
management systems were going to operate in the context of the Platinum
software – the chosen system. Extensive training was undertaken for the
different groups (Accountant General’s Department and ministries) that would
operate the system.
By July 1998 the first pilot runs were made and by end 1998 essential aspects of
the system functioned well. But the capture of revenue data was partial,
reconciliation of central bank accounts difficult and the coverage of the system
far from complete (e.g. development revenue).
During the first half of 1999 the system was rolled out to remaining ministries
and independent departments except for some votes where security concerns
were raised (State House, Defence). These were integrated during 2000.
With the core financial system in place it was possible to start integration of the
budget in the so-called “Platinum” system. Different donors assisted this
exercise. Reclassification of the budget on a GFS basis was undertaken with the
assistance of IMF. Performance budgeting was introduced and Sida supported
mainstreaming of gender in the budget process. The World Bank, UNDP and
bilateral donors supported the introduction of a Medium Term Expenditure
Framework process. Budget books for 2000/2001 were produced using the new
classification system and the budget manager module of the Platinum system.
An independent evaluation carried out in 2000 concluded that “by June 2000,
an IFMS had been installed, with common chart of accounts for budgeting and
accounting purposes, and incorporating a central payments system and control
over expenditure commitments. The system of accounting for public debt has
been improved, and bank accounts have been rationalised”. But “whilst the
overall results points to a progressive improvement in financial management in
GOT, the potential benefits of the IFMS have yet to be fully realised, and a
further consolidation phase will be required before the project is complete”.
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The LTA left his position in December 2000 but short-term TA and funding
was provided throughout 2001. In July 2001 a new Public Finance Act came
into force creating the legal basis for the development that had already taken
place. In May 2001, the Government presented a proposal for continued
support to the IFMS as one component of a larger programme for the
development of the public finance system.
In the proposal the Government identifies the main remaining problems to be:
· Inadequate managerial capacity.
· Inadequate accountability and poor fiscal discipline.
· Inadequate budget planning, formulation, management and execution.
· Ineffective dissemination of information to the public.
In its appraisal Sida notes that some problems are more of a political than a
technical nature e.g. unfunded commitments made by top leadership.
In its risk analysis Sida points to a number of assumptions that need to be met:
· Continued Government commitment.
· Continued donor support.
· Appointment of appropriate counterparts.
· Commitment of budget officers to the new process.
· Software able to support performance budget process.
· Sufficient operating budget.
· Continuation of local cost compensation.
Sida also raise its concern over the lengthy delay in starting up the continued
project and the risk of not having a LTA in place and the negative effect this
might have on the reform momentum.
It should be observed that despite the very positive development that has taken
place, Tanzania still does not meet the minimum standard requirements of PFM
defined above. The request for continued technical assistance also indicates that
the MoF and its Budget Office and Accountant General’s Offices are not yet
capable of undertaking the development work themselves. The capacity to
operate the system seems to have been secured at the technical and routine level
but the demand for information from the system for managerial and policy-
making purposes is still low.
 
3. Auditing
Sweden has been supporting the development of supreme audit institutions
since the 1980s. During the 1990s three long-term projects (5-10 years) were
carried out in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia (still on-going). Since 1998,
support has also been provided to Tribunal Administrativo in Mozambique.
Sida has also been supporting the building up of regional co-operation between
Offices of Auditors General (OAG) in the SADC region.
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All projects have been organised as institutional co-operation projects by
twinning the Swedish National Audit Bureau (NAB) with its counterparts in the
respective countries. The aim has been to build external audit capacity. The
support to Botswana was ended in 1998 after 6 years and to Zimbabwe in 1999
after 10 years. The support to Namibia started in 1994 and financial support
continued from 1999 to 2002 with an option for OAG to request technical
assistance from RRV when needed. The projects in Botswana and Zimbabwe
were terminated as the projects were assessed to have reached their objectives
and the institutions capable of continuing their development without technical
and financial support. The support to the OAG of Namibia is likely to be
terminated for the same reason.
The interventions have focused on enhancing professional/technical competence
in the areas of financial and performance audit. Pioneering work has been done
in introducing and establishing performance auditing in Botswana, Zimbabwe
and Namibia. Introduction of international audit standards and modernisation
of financial audit techniques through IT have been important areas of the
projects. During the 1990s all three institutions were computerised. Typical
outputs from these projects have been handbooks/manuals on financial and
performance auditing.
One to two long-term advisors and short-term experts have provided technical
assistance. Funds have been used for IT investments and staff development
through training and study visits to NAB.
All three organisations had the capacity to receive the technical assistance
provided and to utilise the support to enhance their technical competence. The
management of the organisations seems to have been capable of undertaking
organisational changes and getting acceptance of the need for additional staff to
consolidate their professional achievements.
The support to Tribunal Administrativo in Mozambique (TAM) started in 1998
with an initial study on the feasibility of long-term institutional co-operation
with NAB to build up an external audit capacity. The preparatory process has
gone through a number of steps since this initial study was made. Based on the
study, an LFA workshop was held in early 1999. This workshop resulted in an
agreement to carry on the preparatory work, to carry out a number of studies
and to assist in auditing the annual state accounts for 1998. The studies covered
several important areas. A strategic plan was produced for TAM. Plans were
also produced for human resource management, training, infrastructure
development and IT. A project document was to be prepared on the basis of the
studies and a planning workshop was held in June 2000. A first comprehensive
project document for the period 2000 – 2003 was presented to Sida in the
autumn 2000.
In spite of the considerable efforts put into the preparations, an independent
appraisal of the project document concluded that the ambitions were too high
and the plans unrealistic given the actual state of TAM. Sida had initiated this
appraisal. The weak professional capacity of TA was especially singled out as a
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major obstacle to capacity building. Another related issue brought up was the
role of the advisors. The first annual state accounts had been audited in 2000
with substantial external support. TAM’s few available qualified staff would be
compelled to attend to its statutory obligations, with little time left for capacity
building activities. The appraisal team suggested therefore that support should
also be provided to actually carry out the audits and that this support should
form part of the project. This proposal contradicted the general philosophy of
institutional co-operation, according to which the role of technical assistance
personnel is supposed to be purely advisory. The appraisal team also noted that
the risk analysis mainly dealt with internal structures and to some extent
neglected external, “ in some cases killing factors”.
The ambitions of the project have to some extent been reduced. It seems as
though the project parties have accepted that the effort will require a very long
time perspective and that a more step-by-step approach should be applied. The
reasons given were the limited opportunity for capacity building, the fact that
TAM was starting from scratch and that the environment in which TA as to
develop also posed many obstacles.
 
4. Revenue
In the revenue area Swedish support has mainly aimed at improved tax
administration. Tax policy issues have only rarely been addressed. Currently
Sweden is funding projects in South Africa and Tanzania. A ten-year project in
Zimbabwe was concluded in 1999.
The support to South Africa started in 1996 with the aim of developing
institutional co-operation between the South African Revenue Authority (SARS)
and the Swedish National Tax Board. Due to reorganisations and a change of
leadership in SARS, only short term consultancy support was provided, mainly
in the IT area, during the following two years. In 1998 a new agreement was
made through which support was to be provided in the areas of analysis of the
tax base, strategy for tax control and audit, strategy for service and
information, development of procedures and IT systems for audit, income tax,
PAYE, VAT and service to taxpayers, and strategy for decentralisation to
provincial offices. The project is ongoing but the documentation available does
not yet provide information about experiences relevant to the purpose of this
report.
The support to Tanzania’s tax administration was resumed in 1999 on request
from the Tanzania Revenue Authority. An agreement has been concluded with
the Swedish National Tax Board to assist in training of staff and management,
and to develop systems for expenditure accounting and for motor vehicle and
driver’s licence registration. This project has also been in operation for a fairly
short time and documentation of experiences is not yet available.
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4.1. Zimbabwe
In the following a brief account will be made of the support to the Department
of Tax (DoT) in Zimbabwe.
Sida involvement in the revenue sector of Zimbabwe started in the mid-1980s
when technical assistance was provided to undertake a complete review of the
whole tax system. The review resulted in far-reaching demands to improve the
efficiency of the DoT and a Sida-sponsored co-operation between DoT and the
Swedish National Tax Board commenced at the end of the 1980s and continued
for more than ten years.
The primary objective of the co-operation was to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of DoT. This was to be achieved largely through the introduction of
modern technology and modern methods of management and planning as well
as the building up of in-house competence.
A major focus of the project has been to assist in the computerisation of various
administrative systems and as a general tool in all work. Computers were not
used by DoT at the start of the project. When the project finished the DoT had
built a functioning computer department capable of developing new
applications and maintaining installed systems. A LAN had been installed at the
headquarters and a WAN connected the headquarters with the provincial
offices. Several administrative procedures had been computerised. The DoT had
reached a high level of computer literacy, with computer support not only in
tax administration but also in general administration.
The computerisation strategy that was followed was pragmatic in the sense that
obvious and pressing problems were addressed. Initially a receipting system was
developed to produce receipts to taxpayers automatically at collection offices.
The payments were automatically accounted for. To this system a posting
system was added, which required registration of all taxpayers. The posting
system facilitated the follow up of tax payments. Taxpayer identification
numbers (TINs) were introduced for all individual taxpayers and at the end of
the project work was under way to introduce TINs for companies. Parallel to
this development, computers were introduced in the general administration and
a number of special applications were developed and put into use.
The computerisation resulted in higher efficiency, as evidenced by improved
customer services and especially after the mid-1990s in sharply increased tax
collection. The computerisation also led to redundancies but these were possible
to handle as the Government also implemented public administration reform
where reduction of employment in the public sector was an objective. The IT
systems unit that was developed has all along been vulnerable to resignations.
The schemes of service available to DoT did not include posts for computer
specialists. DoT could not therefore match the remuneration levels on the
labour market for these categories of staff. A significant number of trained staff
has resigned for better-paid jobs but in spite of that, the unit functioned
satisfactorily.
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Training of computer users and specialists has been a major activity of the
project throughout its duration.
The institutional co-operation was obviously made use of by the DoT top
management. The National Tax Board was invited to participate in DoT annual
planning conferences and through study visits to Sweden the DoT managers got
to know about the organisation, planning and management procedures of the
National Tax Board. The computerisation made the need to reorganise the
department apparent and in 1995 a new functional organisation structure was
implemented. By mid 1990s, DoT also embarked on an exercise to introduce
annual corporate planning which since 1996/97 has been institutionalised and
regarded as a very powerful management tool to direct the operations of the
whole DoT. At first, corporate planning was introduced at the headquarters
and in a second step, provincial offices were incorporated. DoT was the first
Zimbabwe government agency to implement corporate planning. An ambitious
management training programme accompanied the introduction of corporate
planning. More than 200 middle managers were trained in management and
leadership skills.
The positive development recorded by the end of the 1990s led to Sida
considering the time ripe to phase out the support. Some extra funds were
provided in 2000 to enable assistance in developing the follow up methods for
the corporate plan.
Throughout the whole project period, the National Tax Board has provided
long-term advisors with IT and management backgrounds. Short-term
specialists from the National Tax Board were involved in specific activities.
Systems development and staff development have constituted the main types of
intervention. Systems development activities were generally carried out by
putting together small task teams of DoT staff supported by the LTA and short-
term specialists. However, substantial investment resources were also provided
to build up the IT infrastructure.
The DoT top management has played an active role during the whole project
and grasped the purpose of capacity building at an early stage. At the end of the
project the DoT had reached a reasonable level of efficiency in carrying out its
regular operations. IT was the main technical tool and competence fairly well
developed to sustain maintenance and development of new applications.
Taxpayer relationships had improved and a service orientation had developed
in the whole organisation. The risk to sustainability and further development
seemed to emanate from the unfavourable economic development of Zimbabwe
and the financial position of the Government that threatened its ability to retain
staff, especially skilled IT experts and its capacity to maintain and renew
equipment.
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5. Regional co-operation
During the 1990s Sida has assisted in building up the East and Southern African
Association of Accountants General (ESAAG) and the Southern African
Development Community Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions
(SADCOSAI).
The support to SADCOSAI started in 1989, when it focused on establishing the
organisation and on financing of training. The Swedish National Audit Bureau
has acted as institutional partner and consultant to SADCOSAI. SADCOSAI
conducts training, including of trainers in auditing, and manages a scholarship
and exchange programme. It has also developed and adopted a quality control
system and a code of conduct for auditors. The South African SAI provides a
secretariat for the executive committee of SADCOSAI. The organisation is now
well established but still requires financial support.
Sida started to fund meetings between Accountants General in the east and
southern African region in 1993 and in 1994 the association was formally
created. ESAAG is also well established, with a secretariat operating from
Pretoria, but needs continued financial support. A Swedish consulting firm has
assisted ESAAG during the build up period. ESAAG supports its member
countries in implementing the International Government Accounting Standards
and Internal Audit Standards, by providing management training, strategic
planning methodology, gender training, a code of conduct and a public
accounts committee handbook.
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Annex 2: NORAD Experiences
1. Introduction
The key data source for this examination of selected Norwegian experience
with support for capacity building in PFM in Africa has been NORAD’s project
database and archives. The number of interventions (programmes and projects)
that deal with PFM is clearly dependent on the definition of PFM and capacity
building. Budget support programmes and sectors support projects were
included since these types of intervention will often include components of
capacity building in PFM. A listing of 56 projects that span all Norwegian main
co-operating countries in Africa is the basis for the brief analysis below.
Only nine of the projects where archival material could be found had a start
date earlier than 1999. More than half of the projects were started in 2000 or
later. In all these cases there was little or no information that could form a basis
for analysing experience. The relatively recent origin of most projects made it
difficult to consider more than a few projects in any depth. In addition to the
archival material, the authors used their own knowledge of projects/
programmes/ interventions and utilised some experience from available World
Bank / IMF material.
The composition of Norwegian-funded projects and agreements and the change
in their composition over time revealed some interesting features.
The support for PFM (excluding budget support or the like) has been rising
strongly over the last 5-10 years. The total expenditure on such interventions
has increased perhaps 20-fold during the period and the expansion seems set to
continue. Expenditure on PFM support has been increasing over time relative to
expenditure on budget support and sectoral programmes, meaning that the
concern for PFM has not only been led by the concern for not squandering
donor money.
The greatest share of the aid for PFM has gone to planning and statistics.
District planning and decentralisation as well as general good governance
projects have also received considerable funding. The other components of PFM
have received far less attention. This goes for accounting, auditing and measures
directed towards the fight against corruption. Only minuscule amounts seem to
have gone toward support for revenue collection. Equally, support for the
improvement of procurement systems has received very little attention. The
various components have developed quite differently over time, as illustrated
below.
2. Good governance
There has been an emphasis on good governance interventions through the
latter half of the nineties, with an increasing tendency. Early projects
concentrated on support to electoral processes, particularly in Uganda. In
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Angola, Norway works with the UNDP to strengthen the competence of
government generally. Also, a Norwegian research institute, the Chr Michelsen
Institute (CMI), is soon to start research co-operation on good government and
institutional development with a local counterpart. In Tanzania, projects have
largely dealt with issues of public sector reform. In Zambia, most of the effort
under good governance has been research and analysis rather than capacity
building. In Ethiopia a small project started in 1998, aimed at the training of
members of parliament. In Uganda a project for the promotion of good
governance was started in 1999 for support to the Inspectorate General of
Government in co-operation with UNDP. In Zambia, recently started
programmes comprise capacity building for good governance in local
administration and political/economic research through co-operation between
INESOR of Zambia and CMI of Norway.
2.1. CSRP in Tanzania
Reforms in any of the core areas of PFM take place within the broader
framework of government administrative structures. The broad-based
Norwegian support for the Civil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) in
Tanzania includes a number of components that will indirectly support and
strengthen PFM. Started in 1991 by the Tanzanian government in close co-
operation with the UNDP, the CSRP was given the broad aim of improving the
efficiency of the public sector.
A Nordic evaluation of the programme completed in early 1995 concluded that
although the programme was of key importance for Tanzania’s development, it
was donor-driven to a great extent and essentially a programme to cut the size
of the civil service. It was not enough geared to improving efficiency in the
remaining parts of the administration. In line with the study’s
recommendations, Norway’s approach as a donor was to start a dialogue with
the Tanzanian Government in order to influence the direction of the
programme in a positive way and, over time, monitor and consider the
ownership issue.
After the autumn 1995 elections, President Mkapa put good governance and
administrative reform at the top of the political agenda, thereby increasing the
degree of government ownership of the ongoing process. Inertia and lack of
capacity within the bureaucracy became the more important blockages to
reform. The emphasis of reform was put less singularly on staff reduction.
The new political environment led to increased Norwegian co-operation within
the CSRP. Components of the Norwegian support with a relevance for PFM
comprised (a) organisational efficiency reviews which among other things
looked at departmental establishments, terms of reference and budgeting (b)
local government reform including a study of decentralised budgeting for
districts and (c) management structures and management skills.
A “think piece” from the Dar Es Salaam embassy from early 1998 looks at the
future orientation of the support for CSRP. The document sets out some
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interesting experiences and considerations from the viewpoint of a donor.8 The
points are applicable not only to Tanzania but also in general for the
development of public administration, including PFM.
The paper points out a central paradox of institutional reform: While its aim is
to increase the capacity of the institutions, there are few activities that are as
demanding on capacity as reform itself. Weak capacity, which characterised the
situation in Tanzania, was therefore both a reason for reform and a hindrance.
The natural tendency for groups that benefit from the existing system to
counteract reform is also referred to.
Donor field offices, which are key institutions for the implementation of
assistance, are subject to pressure from higher (home) authorities to spend
donor money. Home authorities often use spending as an indicator for the
relative success of field offices. In this context, assistance for public sector
reform is not attractive since key reforms may often be done without any use of
funding at all. Other characteristics of such reforms are that the development of
good reform programmes requires a high input of special professional capacity,
that projects often have very long gestation times and that project outcomes are
often both difficult to describe and uncertain. None of these characteristics
make projects “efficient” in terms of spending.
Donors are also often reluctant to engage in institutional reform programmes
because they tend to be “sensitive” in the sense that they can seldom be isolated
from political reform. Local government reforms, for example, are frequently
dependent on local politicians for the realisation of potential effects. Donors are
reluctant to be seen to be unduly involved in the internal affairs of the recipient
country. Such exposure is particularly easy to attract in the course of
institutional change processes, which are invariably at odds with set ways and
established power positions.
The demand for theoretical background, practical experience in advocacy as
well as planning and implementation of institutional change can often be
difficult to fill for donor representatives running small offices or embassies in
the recipient countries.
These and other obstacles are to blame for the apparent tendency to move only
very slowly, if at all, from the stage of study to implementation in the field of
institutional change projects. The document argues that it is important to go
into support projects at a realistic level of ambition. An overly active role in
advocacy and action may raise difficult and delicate technical and political
issues. An overly high profile may reduce the room for manoeuvre and
pragmatic assessment. The “think piece” suggests that a relatively small donor
like Norway should generally leave such roles to the major multilateral
organisations.
                                           
8 Strategi for Norsk Bistand til Civil Service Reform Programme i Tanzania. VP 1998,
Hovedutfordring 2.
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Support for institutional (civil service) reform programmes should be considered
as long-term processes where dialogue at the higher levels is kept alive and
plans are pragmatically adjusted along the way.
It is felt that a high degree of flexibility may be attained within a basket
financing arrangement between several donors or a bilateral frame agreement
that simplifies procedures to accept and disburse funding to projects within the
frame.
3. Planning and Budgeting
The PFM component probably receiving most support from Norway over time
has been the planning and budgeting component, including statistics. This
component was emphasised throughout the nineties and seems set to expand
considerably during 2000 – 2002.
Key projects under this heading include support to policy research in
Mozambique (Gabinete de Estudos). Statistical capacity building projects and
support for general administration were run in Mozambique and Eritrea.
Tanzania and Zambia received support for the PRSP process and a macro
modelling project has been running for a long time in Tanzania. In Ethiopia,
Norway has been giving support to the PRSP consultation process as well as to
a local institute for policy research. In Malawi, recent projects have supported
PRSP planning as well as policy analysis processes in the Office of the Vice-
President.
3.1. Gabinete de Estudos, Mozambique
From 1996 an important part of Norway’s support to Mozambique has been
budget support, which is provided in co-operation with nine other donors. A
main objective of the support is implementation of the country’s poverty
reduction strategy. Improvements in PFM and tax systems are also considered
important objectives.
It appears that the start of budget support triggered improvements in PFM in
Mozambique, which initially was in a very poor state. Joint donor reviews
suggested that a sustainable process may have been set off. The latest (2001)
Joint Donor Review points out significant achievements, including the drafting
of a new public finance act, initiatives to undertake a Public Expenditure
Review and a Country Financial Accountability Assessment. Also, quarterly
budget assessment reports are now prepared and work on a more detailed
system of budget classification is under way.
The PFM system in Mozambique, however, still does not comply with the
minimum requirements for an appropriate system. The report points out that a
significant amount of resources available to the public sector is not included in
the budget and state accounts, and the lack of priority and resources for audit
institutions jeopardise their ability to perform their role effectively in the future.
The report stresses the need for a comprehensive time-bound action plan for all
elements of the reform process in the financial management area. The
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importance of attention to these areas was dramatically exposed in 2002 when
it became clear that budget support funds had been used in unintended ways.
While budget support, apart from other advantages, has functioned as an
incentive for improvements in the PFM system and indirectly had a positive
effect on the country’s desire for improvements, the Norwegian support (jointly
with Sweden and Switzerland) to Gabinete de Estudos (GE) has had a more
direct focus on capacity building in certain components of the PFM system.
The GE is established under the Ministry of Planning and Finance as a policy
and research unit. A review of GE9 in 1999 found that its origin was soundly
based on clearly identified needs expressed by the Government and not “donor
driven”. Important such needs were Government’s wish to be better prepared in
negotiations with IFIs and donors as well as better analysis of resource
allocation in the public sector, foreign debt, and the timing and design of
structural reforms in the economy. The review stated that the institution was
based on strong Government ownership and that the GE’s contributions to
policy analysis were of high quality, timely and responsive to needs.
A team from the Harvard Institute of International Development (HIID) was
responsible for a programme of technical assistance to the GE. The
responsibility of the team would be to “fill gaps” in technical competence and
performance as well as to train in order to build up an effective national
capacity.
The review demonstrates nearly all the classic conflicts that are likely to arise
with similar units:
First, there is the question of the degree of autonomy given to the organisation.
Since the GE was fairly autonomous within the ministry and reported to the
minister, the link to decision-making was excellent and the group could focus
on policy analysis and not be bogged down in routine work. At the same time,
the peripheral relation to other departments of the ministry might be a
hindrance for the capacity building effect to realise its potential in the longer
term.
Second, the tendency for the TA team was to focus more on challenging and
interesting macro policy issues than on the relatively mundane need to train
young professionals. The lack of young Mozambican professionals and the need
for attention to the urgent needs of the political leadership were factors that
reinforced this tendency.
Third, the involvement of the GE and the HIID group with the University was
limited because there was a lack of qualified researchers at the University and
because qualified staff were very busy doing consultancies to enhance their
                                           
9 Evaluation of Support to Gabinete de Estudos in Ministry of Planning and Finance,
Mozambique. Commissioned by Sida, NORAD and the Swiss Development Co-operation. Svein
Jørgensen and Dag Aarnes, Nordic Consulting Group, 27 November 1999. Most of our
analysis of the GE is based on this report.
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incomes. The University also suffered from a severe lack of facilities and was
mired in internal battles. It also did not help that the HIID personnel did not
speak Portuguese. An attempt by the HIID group to help set up an “Applied
Studies Centre” was stopped by internal wrangling.
Fourth, the links of GE to statistical institutions were not well developed. It is
not unusual for units like GE to be focused on policy issues to the extent that
they ignore giving attention to painstaking statistical analysis and feedback to
statistical offices. In the long run this has a negative effect on the quality of
statistics and research.
Fifth, the review points to the effect of major differences in salaries and working
conditions between central banks and the ministries of finance, a situation
which is typical for Africa. “The country can ill afford to have a fully staffed
and relatively large research Department in its central bank when it is unable to
staff the economic policy unit in the Ministry of Finance”.
There may be solutions to all these problems and the review points out a good
many. However, a fundamental problem is that even though policy analysis,
capacity building, academic work and statistical analysis are complementary,
contradictions both with regard to approach and capacity will arise as soon as
an enthusiastic donor attempts to combine them all.
3.2. MACMOD in Tanzania
A long-lasting project has been the Norwegian support for budget analysis and
macro modelling in Tanzania. The project stems from an initiative taken by the
World Bank in the late eighties. The Chr Michelsen Institute was requested to
undertake a short consultancy on the possible construction of a model for
budget analysis, working with a group composed of staff from the Planning
Commission and the Ministry of Finance in Tanzania. It appears that the idea
had not come from the Tanzanian Government, which, however, had accepted
the project. The project that was drawn up was to take place over a 2-3 year
period and included some intermittent TA and a few computers, which until
then had been nearly unused technology in the macroeconomic unit of the
Planning Commission. In the Ministry of Finance, computers had been
introduced through the Sida project reported above.
Some insight was won in PC modelling and budget analysis by the small
macroeconomic working group. Over time, however, attention turned more
towards orthodox macroeconomic modelling. A macroeconomic model was
first introduced in 1992/93 as an analysis tool for the development of the
economic framework for the Rolling Plan and Forward Budget. The emphasis
of the model was on analysis of the impact of fiscal and monetary policy on the
economy. NORAD took over the financing of the project, which from the
beginning of the nineties to 2002 went through three successor projects and
produced three versions of the model. The TA was intermittent and low
intensity and the link between the core groups of economists in Tanzania
(Ministry of Finance, Planning Commission and later also including the Bank of
Tanzania and revenue authorities) and at CMI in Norway was gradually built
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up. Relative to its small size the project has been evaluated surprisingly
frequently. Below are mentioned some interesting features brought out by the
evaluations.
There has been a recurring concern with the ability of the Tanzanian staff to use
the model. Whereas TA activities often took place at junctures where IMF
teams visited and in connection with GC meetings, this did not mean that the
Tanzanian members of the Macro group were unable to use the model. At a
number of occasions seminars were arranged where the team did convincing
presentations of technicalities and the policy use of the model.
One review finds it negative that the project has been run by a small group of
enthusiastic individuals. The individualisation, however, could well be the
reason why the model has not lost its foothold in an organisational
environment characterised by rapid change.
Perhaps the most interesting feature mentioned in the review material is the
support that the modelling work has attracted from the political level as well as
from donors. The World Bank has been particularly interested and supportive.
At a seminar in May 2002 a World Bank representative remarked that the
model “had done a lot of good to the economy”!
It is clearly stated that the model in its final version is more sophisticated than
the World Bank and IMF calculations that have formed the basis for fiscal and
monetary policies. The fact that the model framework is so well regarded has
brought about considerable self-confidence in the Tanzanian modelling group.
The Tanzanian side of the technical discussion with IFIs about important macro
policy aspects has become much stronger. With newly won self-confidence, the
macro group is more likely to take on additional modelling attempts. Modelling
for better revenue projections is already under way in an accessory model called
TAXMOD.
Since the model is soundly theoretically based and has been made transparent
through proper documentation, the policy staff has also attracted considerable
interest from academic economists. Hopefully this will lead to both more
knowledge about the model and its use and more scrutiny of its technical
aspects.
The project overall has been considered successful. However, it has broken a
number of the rules in the book for good project planning and management.
Important factors holding it together for 12 years have been the convergence of
interest from the main stakeholders, technical staff, donors and policy makers.
4. Accounting
In the field of accounting, support to African countries was relatively low
during the nineties but has gained importance at the beginning of the new
millennium.
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Important interventions in this area are support to Zambian institutions and
scholarships as well as support to the Ministry of Finance and the Accounts
Committee.
5. Payments
There has been very little if any emphasis on this field. One project in Angola,
started 2000, gives support to a project for updating and reviewing current
rules and regulations for state procedures on the acquisition of goods and
services.
6. Audit
Support for audit has taken place only since the mid-nineties. The support for
Zambia’s Auditor General is the main Norwegian project in this category.
Norway is also supporting preparatory work for co-operation between the
Swedish National Audit Office and the Malawi Auditor General.
The institutional support to INTOSAI, which aimed at establishing and manage
a secretariat for INTOSAI Development, has also been a route of support to the
audit component.
6.1. Office of the Auditor General in Zambia
Under an agreement signed in 1997 Norway gave technical and financial
assistance to the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) in Zambia during 1997-
2001. A successor programme is planned / under implementation.
The process that led to the start of implementation took 6 years from the initial
idea of providing assistance that arose in 1992. Activities during these years
included fact-finding missions, consultancy reports, a number of meetings
between the OAG and its Norwegian counterpart and the preparation of a
project document. The process was delayed by a two year Norwegian aid
“freeze” over 1995-1997.
The overall purpose of the assistance was to improve the OAG’s ability to
conduct independent, timely and cost-effective audits in order to ensure optimal
utilisation of government resources. The main components of the assistance
were staffing of a small project team at the OAG, equipment and training as
well as co-operation between the two OAGs. The project was undertaken in the
context of the Zambian Public Service Reform Programme (PRSP), which was
launched in 1993.
A mid-term review of the project10 made the point that few indicators for
progress in terms of project efficiency and effectiveness had been constructed at
the outset. Still, it was found that the project was generally on track, carrying
out activities and achieving planned outputs with reasonable progress and
quality. A number of findings on the various project components render
valuable experience.
                                           
10 OAG Mid-term Review, Final Report, May 2000
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The organisational restructuring of the OAG that went along with the project
was only partly implemented. A decentralisation component, not to be
supported by the project, did not show much achievement due to lack of
funding. In terms of training, courses had been delivered on schedule although a
question mark was put on the actual transfer of knowledge. Hardware items (IT
and transport) had been delivered but familiar questions arose as to the use and
purpose of hardware items. Of the most directly important components of the
project “Audit quality”, there was considerable progress in the area of
performance audit, which was initially very weak or non-existent and where the
building of a new unit and staff training were relatively easier tasks.
The financial audit side was where most of the activities of the OAG took place
and where most of the staff were engaged. The fact that the project would have
to interfere in a “going concern” to introduce new work methodology made it a
complex process requiring management decisions. Clear project objectives like
the production of manuals may seem important benchmarks in the project
context, but the end result really concerns the extent and speed at which staff
accept and understand auditing standards.
Institutional co-operation or twinning between the two OAGs was one facet of
the project. The evaluation report points to the importance of the
understanding and implementation of such co-operation. It is indicated that the
way institutional co-operation appeared in the project document, as a
component with its own budget line, was taken to mean that it should be
considered a purpose per se. The Norwegian OAG’s comments on the mode of
institutional co-operation made the point, saying that “… defining institutional
co-operation between the two OAGs was a wrong way of doing it. By doing it
this way the co-operation appears to be an activity/work area like the others.
The idea was to use the co-operation as a means to carry out activities.”
Institutional development had largely focused on human resources and
equipment. A greater focus on organisation and systems development aspects
would have to rely on the exchange of ideas about models and modalities and
would require a framework of institutional co-operation. To capture the
advantages of institutional co-operation it was seen important that it enabled
individual contact between staff members of the co-operating organisations,
perhaps particularly at the higher levels.
Almost too commonplace to mention: the “people part” of any project counts.
The evaluation points out that there appeared to be a feeling of distance
between the project staff and the OAG staff. This was tentatively attributed to
the fact that project group members were appointed externally. Relations,
however, varied considerably between individuals and work situations.
Assessments of the Norwegian contributions by involved staff are interesting in
that they perhaps contradict the not uncommon attitude among northern
institutions that they are necessarily ahead in all fields. Interviewees on the
Zambian side expressed the view that Norwegian contributions were not
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always significant and that in some areas the OAG of Norway was not much
ahead of its Zambian counterpart.
The problems of staff retention were quite serious - for more than one reason.
Some of the reasons, like the perception that they were a low-status group in
the civil service, were specific for the audit staff. Others, like a lack of amenities
and equipment at the workplace, would have been a commonplace constraint
for the entire civil service. The main reason for retention problems is, however,
likely to be that the market value for a well-qualified auditor is much higher
than what is reflected in government conditions. “OAG finds it difficult to
retain well educated staff (degree holders and professionals) and within the
current general government conditions it is not possible to create special career
paths for auditors willing to study.”
The question of sustainability is central to all development projects. In the
context of institutional development, which is essentially a never-ending
process, sustainability will have to be defined as the institution’s ability to carry
on development unaided ad infinitum. The vexed question for donors and
recipients alike is when the break-off point should be. A successor programme
for support to the OAG for a three-year period will be part of the financial
management component of the Public Sector Capacity Building project in
Zambia.
Despite considerable progress in enabling the OAG to function better, the
project’s impact remains limited by factors which do not lie within its terms of
reference but are part of Zambia’s own institutional and legal structure. The
report holds that “recommendations based on OAG audit reports are to a
limited extent implemented. There are a number of measures proposed for
enhancing the OAG’s impact, including: making OAG fully autonomous and
independent; letting OAG report directly to Parliament; giving the Public
Accounts Committee the mandate and resources to effectively monitor and
apply sanctions related to audit recommendations, etc.”
7. Revenue
There has been very little specific emphasis in this area. The modelling project
in Tanzania, touched on above, has included a component of tax modelling
(TAXMOD), working with the Ministry of Finance and the Tanzania revenue
bureau.
8. Corruption
Intervention in this area did not take place before the end of the nineties. An
early project was the support for the anti-corruption commission in Zambia.
Other important projects in this area have been in Tanzania (support for
development of an anti-corruption strategy) and Malawi (support to the anti-
corruption bureau).
9. Local administration, decentralisation
Projects under this heading started to emerge in the late nineties. Important
interventions include support for strengthening local government in three
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districts of the Northern Province in Zambia; good governance at the local level
in Uganda (fiscal decentralisation, fact-finding studies, and a review of the
LGDP and PAF modalities). In Malawi there is a NOK 45 million project for
the decentralisation plan covering the legal framework, civic education,
institutional development, fiscal reform, accounting and financial management,
devolution of functions as well as local development planning. In Tanzania the
focus under this component is the financing of local government reform with a
budget of some 40 million NOK. In Mozambique the interventions have
included local government economic management, capacity building and
decentralised planning. Projects here may focus on decentralisation generally
but also usually contain considerable elements of capacity building in PFM.
10. General PFM projects
This group of interventions contains programmes more vaguely connected to
PFM. There are a number of projects in this category. Important through
several projects has been work around planning and general PFM in
Mozambique and general support for financial management in Zambia and
Tanzania. Support to CFAAs in Malawi and Mozambique and training for
public administration in Mozambique are projects under this category.
Financial support to public expenditure reviews in Tanzania over a number of
years and brief studies on macroeconomic issues in Uganda and Zambia might
also be included.
11. Sector/budget support
A number of “basket” type projects do contain smaller or larger components of
PFM. These include health and education sector support in Ethiopia and health
sector support in Malawi, Mozambique and Uganda. Budget/macro support
projects are active in Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda. In agreements with
recipient countries on macro and budget support, Norway has adopted as a
standard performance criterion: “progress in public financial management
reform”. This criterion is used actively as a guide to decisions on disbursement.
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This study was contracted by Sida and NORAD for the purpose
of summarising experiences in capacity building for Public Finance
Management (PFM) in Africa.  In particular, the two organisations’
attempts to take a more comprehensive approach to PFM were to
be highlighted. The study is a desk study, based on a review of policy
documents.
An overview of the Swedish and Norwegian approach for
support to PFM reveals a number of similarities between the two
donors.  In particular, since the seventies and eighties, their approach
has moved away from the concept of “filling holes” based on stand-
alone technical assistance to PFM institutions.  Presently, the donor
agencies, at least in theory, approach PFM as a system, comprising
the above-mentioned components.  In the diagnostic phase they
attempt to take a systemic view, although most interventions focus
components or sub-components.
Tentative recommendations that the authors see emerging
from their examination of Sida and NORAD projects as well as
other sources of experience are as follows:
- A long view is necessary.
- It is important to analyse the entire PFM system and to
undertake interventions that are balanced  between the
components of PFM  (Planning, budgeting, Auditing,
Accounting etc.).
- Support the education and training of economists and
accountants  to build up a strong professional cadre of
accountants and economists.
- Improve human resource management systems (like salaries and
career opportunities) to attract competent personnel for PFM.
- Institutionalise the dialogue between recipient agencies and
donor agencies during both diagnostic and implementation
stages.
- The development perspective has to guide the development of
PFM.
- Ideally, the recipient government, not the World Bank should
provide leadership for support to PFM under joint donor
“umbrellas”.
- Support and encourage regional organisations and networks in
the PFM field.
- Consider implementation conditions such as: The level of
political will to improve PFM; Degree of organisational and
institutional blockages; Terms and conditions for key staff;
Capacity for capacity building
- Link PRSP poverty reduction approaches, budgetary support
and PFM improvement. The quality of PFM will be a decisive
factors in ensuring that recipients policy decisions and
agreements with donors actually lead to a greater flow of public
sector resource for poverty reduction.
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